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Review, Secrecy in U.S. National Security: Why a Paradigm Shift Is Needed 
by James B. Bruce, Sina Beaghley, and W. George Jameson    
 
      Reviewed by Steven Aftergood1 
 
 
Secrecy in U.S. National Security: Why a Paradigm Shift Is Needed,  
Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corp, 2018. 35 pp. / 





 The national security classification system today is in an advanced  
state of decay. It neither protects secrets reliably against unauthorized  
disclosure and espionage nor releases them to the public when their  
sensitivity has diminished or lapsed. So it is well past time to remedy  
this situation, a RAND Corporation study concluded in 2018. And more  
than simple fixes will be needed. Bruce, Beaghley, and Jameson (n.d.),  
the authors of the RAND study, suggest that “to achieve meaningful  
improvements in secrecy reform, tinkering at the margins must yield  
to systemic changes.” The authors go on to observe that a  
A much-improved system will afford significantly better  
protection to secrets that truly need it; reduce complexity,  
subjectivity, and overclassification by providing clear parameters  
for creating secrets; and more fully support government  
transparency goals. (Bruce, Beaghley, and Jameson n.d.) 
 
 According to the authors, the many previous efforts to address  
the problem of secrecy in the research literature were hampered “by the  
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absence of any conceptual framework with the theoretical power and reach  
needed to address the modernization of secrecy” (Bruce, Beaghley, and  
Jameson 2018, 3). 
 The study’s claim to novelty is therefore the use of the  
“paradigm concept” advanced by Thomas S. Kuhn – which refers to the  
structure, culture, rules and technologies of secrecy as well as the processes  
by which they are employed – to help analyze the failures of secrecy and to 
identify needed reforms (Bruce, Beaghley, and Jameson 2018, 2-3): 
Our use of the paradigm concept presents a basis for comprehensive 
theoretical insights into secrecy [along with] ideas and hypotheses to  
create evidence-based policy recommendations that can mitigate or  
reverse secrecy performance failings. (3) 
 
 Those with an interest in national security secrecy can read the report,  
which is not very long, and decide for themselves how productive the new 
analytical framework is and how actionable the ensuing recommendations  
are likely to be. In my view, the results are underwhelming. Beyond  
reiterating the need for change, the study provides little practical guidance  
for transforming the status quo. Few if any of the recommendations are  
altogether new. Some are well-worn (e.g., enforce the “need-to-know”  
principle); others were proposed decades ago to no effect (e.g., legislate a 
comprehensive secrecy and transparency statute); and yet others are  
already underway to some degree (e.g., reduce the number of cleared  
personnel). 
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 The authors, who are national security professionals with deep  
experience in classification matters, are certainly correct that secrecy policy  
would benefit from greater theoretical insight and analytical rigor. But that  
worthy objective is not fully realized in this study, which is best understood  
as part of an ongoing conversation about secrecy, and not as a final  
conclusion or a finished product. 
 In the spirit of continued conversation prompted by the RAND study,  
the following points might be considered for further discussion: 
 
• What is a secret? The study defines a secret as “any” national security 
information that has been classified by the government. But this 
overlooks important qualitative differences that exist among different 
categories of secrecy. A confidential diplomatic communication poses 
different security challenges than the secret design of a submarine 
navigation system, for example, and both are different from the details 
of a pending hostage rescue mission. They are not interchangeable in 
terms of the type of damage they could cause, or the duration of their 
sensitivity, or the degree of public interest in their disclosure. To call 
them all “secrets” and to then advocate greater centralization in their 
handling as this study does might be a mistake. Multiple tailored 
systems of information security could make more sense than a single 
policy of enforced uniformity. 
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• “Overclassification” by itself is not a meaningful complaint. Like nearly 
every critic and commission concerned with secrecy policy, the current 
study broadly condemns “overclassification.” But doing so does not 
advance the discussion because of the simple fact that there is no one 
who is in favor of overclassification! To gain traction on real secrecy 
issues, a more penetrating critique – or at least greater specificity – is 
needed. If one identifies a particular item of information that one 
believes is overclassified, there will almost always be someone who will 
defend its classification as appropriate (except in cases of clear error). 
Frequent disagreements over the legitimacy of specific instances of 
secrecy point to the need for better mechanisms for adjudicating such 
disputes. Currently it is mostly up to the originating agency – which 
classified the information in the first place – to decide whether or not 
to sustain its own position. A more disinterested decision making 
process would likely do a better job of both credibly protecting 
legitimate secrets and compelling disclosure of information that should 
be made public. This would be a structural change with a potentially 
high payoff. 
 
• Personnel might be the missing link. The RAND report is silent on the 
people are who make and implement secrecy policy. But the character 
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and the conduct of the classifiers might be a big part of the problem 
confronting the secrecy system, or a big part of the solution. Even 
cursory experience with official secrecy indicates that not all 
government officials are cut from the same cloth or behave in the 
same way. Some have a principled commitment to constitutional 
government, open society, and public accountability. Others are 
understandably more concerned with accomplishing their assigned 
mission efficiently and with a minimum of friction. The former will more 
willingly accept the complications that can result from increased 
transparency. If that is the goal, the policy question then becomes, 
how can such persons be identified, encouraged and rewarded? 
 
• The secrecy paradigm is already changing due to external factors. If 
we had to wait for a new consensus in favor of the RAND report’s 
various recommendations on secrecy reform, we would likely be 
waiting for a long time. But instead, for better or worse, the reality and 
the scope of official secrecy are changing before our eyes. Perhaps the 
most dramatic example is the case of commercial satellite imagery, 
which is already superior in many respects to the most highly classified 
intelligence satellite imagery of the late cold war era. Yet it is publicly 
available for a reasonable fee, and it has already made the world more 
transparent in a qualitatively new way. Similar developments are 
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evident in high-speed computing, encryption, open source intelligence, 
and many other areas. And while only a small fraction of the US 
population is to be found on the front lines of traditional military 
conflicts, we are all on the front lines of offensive cyber activities, 
foreign information operations, climate change and other new types of 
national security threats. In such areas, we all have a “need to know” 
that demands satisfaction. 
 
 In short, there are many fundamental issues in national security 
classification policy that remain to be addressed, along with many  
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